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RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY UNDER THE HOUSING AND RENT ACT
Over one hundred and thirty years ago Justice Story voiced the
convictions of a young nation when he stated, in Parsons v. Bedford: 1
The trial by jury is justly dear to the American people. It has always
been an object of deep interest and solicitude, and every encroachment
upon it has been watched with great jealousy.
The subsequent history of American jurisprudence gives ample evidence
to attest to the truth of this statement. The present discussion deals
with but one situation in which this right to jury trial has been under
observance in the courts, namely, the circumstances which entitle a
landlord as of right to a trial by jury under the Housing and Rent
Act of 1947.2
In the relatively short span since the advent of rent control, a
mass of litigation has developed. This has resulted in crowded dockets,
added expense to the parties, and a corresponding increase in the
time required for a final determination of the case.3 The Housing and
Rent Act of 1947 and its forerunner, the Emergency Price Control
Act of 1942, 4 have been fruitful sources of this litigation. This is not
surprising when one considers the scope of the rent control law. Its
impact upon the nation has been tremendous for it regulates a 60
billion dollar industry directly affecting 35 million people in areas
having a population of 80 million persons.5
Since the historical development of the rent control acts has been
adequately noted elsewhere, 6 no digression for that purpose need be
made at this time. For purposes of arrangement, a brief discussion of
the means provided for the enforcement of the existing law will be
given, followed by an analysis of each in relation to the principal
question in issue, whether there is a right to jury trial.
1
1 3 Pet. 433, 7 L. Ed. 732, 736 (U. S. 1830).
2 61 STAT. 196 (1947), 50 U.S.C. App. § 1881 et seq. (Supp. 1951), as amended
and extended. Under the present extension the law is to expire June 30, 1952.
Defense Production Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 96, 32d Cong., 1st Sess. § 201
(July 31, 1951).
3 Neuberger, Justice Comes Too Late, Readers Digest, Sept. 1951, p. 26.
4 56 STAT. 23 (1942).
5 Woods, The Administration of a Law: Federal Rent Control, 25 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 409, 416 (1950). Statistics dated as of March 23, 1950.
6 See Note, Delegation and Separability Aspects of the Housing and Rent Act
of 1949, 25 NOTRE DAME LAW. 79, 81 et seq. (1950).
7 For a chronological analysis of enforcement features of the acts see: Rodney,
History of Rent Control Laws with Respect to Damages Allowable Thereunder,
9 F. R. D. 501 (1950).
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The questions involved in this discussion arise in actions brought
pursuant to two sections of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947.8 In
substance, the first, Section 1895, provides that any person who de-
mands, accepts, or receives any payment of rent in excess of the
prescribed maximum shall be liable to the person from whom it is
demanded, accepted or received in the amount of $50 or three times
the amount of the overcharge, whichever is greater. However, if the
defendant proves that the violation was neither willful nor the result
of failure to take practicable precautions against the violation, then
the recovery is limited to the amount of the overcharge. 9 Should the
tenant fail to bring suit within thirty days, the United States may
institute the action within one year and bar subsequent recovery by
the tenant. In Section 1896 the statute recites that whenever, in the
judgment of the Housing Expediter, 10 any person has engaged or is
about to engage in any acts which will constitute a violatidn of the
Act, the United States may make application to any court of competent
jurisdiction and after a showing of the violation or threat of violation,
the court may grant a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining
order, or other such order.
The remedies may be summarized as follows: In actions instituted
by the United States, permanent or temporary injunction, restraining
order, or other such order; in actions by either the United States or the
tenant, a minimum of $50 or triple the amount of the overcharge,
whichever is greater.
Injunction and Restitution
If the landlord is to be entitled as of right to a trial by jury, the
right must be one which is cognizable under the Seventh Amendment
to the Constitution." This provides in part:
In suits at common law where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.... [Emphasis
supplied.]
Thus the right has been held to apply only to common law suits and
not to actions in equity 12 or to demands equitable in nature. 13 As a
test, the Court in Parsons v. Bedford,14 stated:
8 61 STAT. 193 (1947), as amended, go U.S.C. App. § 1881 et seq. (Supp. 1951).
9 This defense was not available to the landlord under the Emergency Price
Control Act as originally passed. 56 STAT. 23 (1942).
10 The office of Housing Expediter has been terminated and the authority
under this section has been vested in the Economic Stabilization Administrator.
Exec. Order No. 10276, 16 Fxo. REG. 7535 (1951), as amended, Exec. Order No.
10293,16 FED. RO. 9927 (1951).
11 United States v. Friedland, 94 F. Supp. 721 (D. Conn. 1950).
12 Walling v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 52 F. Supp. 670, 671 (ED.
N.Y. 1943).
13 Hawkins v. Rellim Investment Co., 92 Fla. 784, 110 So. 350 (1926).
14 3 Pet. 433, 7 L. Ed. 732, 737 (U.S. 1830).
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By common law they [the framers] meant what the Constitution
denominated in the third article "law;" not merely suits, which the
common law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but suits
in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contra-
distinction to those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and
equitable remedies were administered ...
Thus, in determining whether a civil case is to be tried to the court
or to a jury, it becomes necessary to categorize the claim as either legal
or equitable.
In suits by the Expediter for an injunction or a restraining order 15
no conflict exists on the question of right to a trial by jury. It is well
settled that injunctive relief is peculiar to a court of equity 16 and
does not fall within the meaning of the Seventh Amendment." 7 Various
arguments have been advanced in attempts to have such cases coming
under the Housing and Rent Act moved to the jury calendar. For
example, in Woods v. Blake, 8 the contention was that under the
merger of law and equity 19 the right to a jury trial attaches to issues
of fact, not to suits of a certain character. In denying the demand,, the
court cited Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 2 0 which stated
that this merger under the Federal Rules has neither enlarged nor
diminished the right to a jury trial.21 Since the restraining order is by
its nature merely a part of a motion for injunction,22 it would follow
that demand for jury trial in such suit would meet with a similar
lack of success.
Though restitution is not specifically listed in either section of the
Emergency Price Control Act, it was held in Porter v. -Warner Holding
Co.23 that where the equitable jurisdiction has been properly invoked,
restitution may be granted as being an "other order" within the
meaning of Section 1896 which provides that ". . . a permanent or
temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order shall be granted.
... [Emphasis supplied.] In modern legal usage, restitution has as its
object the prevention of unjust enrichment of the defendant by securing
to the plaintiff that to which he is justly entitled.24 It is not a punitive
15 Only the Housing Expediter may obtain an injunction under § 1896. Luft-
man v. Ross, 75 F. Supp. 627, 628 (S. D. N. Y. 1948).
16 2 STORY, EQuiTy JUIsPRUDENcE § 1184 (14th ed. 1918).
17 McCoy v. Woods, 177 F. (2d) 354, 355 (4th Cir. 1949).
-18 84 F. Supp. 570, 571 (D. N. J. 1949).
19 FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
20 137 F. (2d) 62, 65 (3d Cir. 1943).
21 Also see McCoy v. Woods, 177 F. (2d) 354 (4th Cir. 1949); Bellavance
v. Plastic-Craft Novelty Co., 30 F. Supp. 37, 39 (D. Mass. 1939).
22 Smith v. Coleman, 127 S. W. (2d) 928 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
23 328 U. S. 395, 400-3, 66 S. Ct. 1086, 90 L. Ed. 1332 (1946). This decision
was given under the Emergency Price Control Act which contained materially
the same language as § 1896 of the Housing and Rent Act.
24 Lauffer v. Vial, 153 Pa. Super. 342, 33 A. (2d) 777 (1943).
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measure though, by its nature, it may sometimes appear to be.25 How-
ever, where the transaction involves only the exchange of money (such
as excessive rent) the measure of recovery is the amount of money
received. The recipient is charged with that sum and no more.2 6 In
granting restitution, the Supreme Court in the Porter case distinguished
an action for restitution from an action for triple damages by stating: 27
... a court giving relief under . . . [the triple damage section] acts as a
court of law rather than as a court of equity....
Restitution . . . differs greatly from the damages and penalties which
may be awarded under [the triple damage section]. . . . When the
Administrator seeks restitution .... he asks the court to act in the public
interest by restoring the status quo. . . . Such action is within the
recognized power and within the highest tradition of a court of equity.
Hence, Porter v. Warner Holding Co. did not merely establish that
restitution is a proper "other order," but also reemphasized that this
remedy is within the equitable jurisdiction of the court. Courts follow-
ing this decision deny demands for jury trials on one of two theories;
either that an order for restitution is an equitable adjunct to injunc-
tion,28 or, that where injunctive relief may be denied, restitution may
be granted as an equitable remedy in itself, independent of injunc-
tion. 29 In either event, it is clear that the cause of action is equitable
in nature and that no constitutional right to a jury trial exists.30
Triple Damages
Where the action is clearly equitable little difficulty is presented.
The major problem arises when the party bringing the action invokes
Section 1895 and seeks triple damages for the overcharge. In deciding
whether a trial by jury in a triple damage suit is the defendant's con-
stitutional right, it becomes necessary to determine the nature of the
action - whether civil or criminal, legal or equitable - and to ascer-
tain whether actions of this nature were cognizable under common
law in 1791.
A triple damage clause, and its problem of jurisdiction, is neither
peculiar to the Housing and Rent Act nor is it an innovation which
has arisen since the adoption of the Seventh Amendment. Moreover,
the courts before which triple damage issues have been presented have
25 RESTATEmENT, REsTITUTIoN, INTRODucToRY NoTEs §§ 150-59 (1937).
26 RESTATEmENT, REsTITUTioN § 150 (1937).
27 328 U. S. 395, 402, 66 S. Ct. 1086, 90 L. Ed. 1332 (1946).
28 McCoy v. Woods, 177 F. (2d) 354 (4th Cir. 1949).
29 United States v. Moore, 182 F. (2d) 332 (5th Cir. 1950); United States
v. Cowen's Estate, 91 F. Supp. 331 (D. Mass. 1950); United States v. Mashburn,
85 F. Supp. 968 (W. D. Ark. 1949).
30 Orenstein v. United States, 191 F. (2d) 184 (ist Cir. 1951). But see Cob-
leigh v. Woods, 172 F. (2d) 167 (1st Cir. 1949), in which the court regretted
that it was compelled to follow the Warner Holding Co. case.
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held that actions for penalties under statutes are civil suits as distin-
guished from criminal suits.3 1 Criminal suits must be commenced by
an indictment or information, but triple damage suits are instituted by
a complaint duly served on the defendant.
32 Thus, the right to a trial
by jury is not dependent upon Article III 3 or the Sixth Amendment
to the Constitution.34 If it exists it is by virtue of the Seventh Amend-
ment.35
Though a suit for triple damages was not present in Porter v. Warner
Holding Co., the Court went beyond the facts and stated that this type
action would be one for the enforcement of a penalty and a court
before which such a suit was brought would act as a court of law and
not as a court of equity.36 Though this may have been dictum, courts
have adopted it in deference to the Supreme Court.
37
The principal source of controversy lies in determining the second
question, whether a civil suit for a statutory penalty would have given
rise to a cause of action "at common law" prior to 1791. The common
interpretation of the Seventh Amendment is that it must be construed
in the light of the practice of the courts of law and chancery in Eng-
land at the time the Constitution and the Amendment were adopted.
38
Consequently, though the common law is flexible, the meaning of the
Seventh Amendment of the Constitution is fixed as of that date.
39
Therefore, the solution of this question becomes of prime importance.
The cases denying the right to a trial by jury are often based on
the premise that the triple damage feature is the creature of a statute
and did not exist at common law.
40 To the extent that triple damages
31 Hepner v. United States, 213 U. S. 103, 29 S. Ct. 474, 53 L. Ed. 720 (1909);
Stockwell v. United States, 13 Wall. 531, 20 L. Ed. 491 (U.S. 1871).
32 Hepner v. United States, 213 U. S. 103, 29 S. Ct. 474, 53 L. Ed. 720 (1909).
33 U. S. CoNsT. Art. III, § 2 provides, "The Trial of all Crimes, except in
Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury...."
34 U. S. CoNsT. AmFND. VI provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed. .... "
35 United States v. Regan, 23? U. S. 37, 47, 34 S. Ct. 213, 58 L. Ed. 494
(1914).
36 328 U. S. 395, 402, 66 S. Ct. 1086, 90 L. Ed. 1332 (1946).
37 Orenstein v. United States, 191 F. (2d) 184 (1st Cir. 1951) ; United States
v. Friedland, 94 F. Supp. 721 (D. Conn. 1950); United States v. Jepson, 
90 F.
Supp. 983 (D. N.J. 1950); United States v. Hart, 86 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Va. 1949).
But see United States v. Harris, 89 F. Supp. 537 (E. D. Pa. 1950), 
in which the
court held that such an action was not penal in nature so as to expire on the
death of the landlord.
38 Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat. Bank, 260 U. S. 235, 243, 43 S. Ct. 118,
67 L. Ed. 232 (1923).
39 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S. 474, 487, 55 S. Ct. 296, 301, 79 L. 
Ed. 603
(1935); 1 Coo=EY, CoNsTi ru oNAL LIaraATIONS 124 (8th ed. 1927).
40 United States v. Friedman, 89 F. Supp. 957 (S. D. Iowa 1950); Creedon
v. Arielly, 8 F.R.D. 265 (W. D. N. Y. 1948).
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are authorized by statute this statement is true, but to deny a jury
trial on this basis is to overlook the test of the Seventh Amendment
evidenced in Parsons v. Bedford.41 Thus, if this test is applied, the
controlling feature should not be the type of damages that may be
inflicted, the mode through which the damages originated, or a com-
bination of the two. Rather, it should be the manner in which the right
would have been asserted under the rules of the common law prior
to 1791.
Even before our independence there had grown up under the original
writs certain well-defined actions at common law. Among them was the
action of debt, which included suits for penalties imposed by statute
where no mode of recovery was prescribed. One penalty was measured
by triple the amount of tithes not paid; another was triple the damages
incurred by extortion. 42 In speaking of similar actions of debt upon
statutory penalties, Blackstone held the underlying theory to be a
contract between the individual and society and that "Whatever,
therefore the laws order anyone to pay, that becomes instantly a debt,
which he hath before-hand contracted to discharge." 43 In Hepner v.
United States,44 the Court denied that there need be a fictitious contract
and held that an action of debt would lie whenever a sum certain was
due the plaintiff, or a sum which could be readily reduced to a certainty
- a sum requiring no future valuation to settle its amount. The atti-
tude of the American courts was well stated as early as 1795 in United
States v. Mundell,45 in which the court stated:
A distinction is sometimes taken between a suit at common law and a
suit upon a statute, where the latter is grounded upon different
principles from the former, in which case perhaps it may properly
be said that the one is a trial at common law, the other upon statute....
Thus, in this case, though it be an action on the statute, it is an action of
debt, which is a common law action, and will be tried in a common
law manner ...
The court further pointed out that a distinction between an action of
debt and a suit under a statute may be necessary to establish a cause
of action, "But when the cause of action is shown, the principles of
common law pervade the whole of the trial." 46
One notable case, 47 later cited as authority,48 espoused a materially
'contrary view. While conceding that suit brought pursuant to the
damage clause in the Housing and Rent Act has as its object the
41 3 Pet. 433, 7 L. Ed. 732, 737 (U.S. 1830).
42 1 CmTv, P.EADnnG 111 (15th ed. 1874).
43 3 BL. Comm. *161.
44 213 U. S. 103, 29 S. Ct. 474, 53 L. Ed. 720 (1909).
45 27 Fed. Cas. 23, 28, No. 15,834 (C. C. Vir. 1795).
40 27 Fed. Cas. at 28.
47 United States v. Shaughnessy, 86 F. Supp. 175 (D. Mass. 1949).
48 United States v. Firman, 98 F. Supp. 945 (W. D. Pa. 1951).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
imposition of a penalty, the court denied the defendant's right to a
trial by jury on the theory that this was essentially an "old action in
equity" 49 and as such, triable before a court without a jury. To sub-
stantiate its position, the court cited Pallant v. Sinatra 50 and Arnstein
v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,51 both decided under the copy-
right law. The distinction is elementary. In each of these cases the
plaintiff's demand for a jury trial was denied for two reasons: first,
because the plaintiff by instituting an action in equity waived the right
to a jury trial; and secondly, because the principal relief sought was
for infringement of the copyright and the damages asked were merely
for incidental relief, those flowing naturally from the wrong.5 2 To this
extent equity may grant damages, or as succinctly stated in United
States v. Bernard: 53
... the function of a court of equity goes no farther than to award as
incidental to other relief, or in lieu thereof, compensatory damages. It has
no authority to assess exemplary damages. By applying to a court of
equity for relief, the complainant waives all claim to vindictive damages.
The view that a defendant in a statutory damage suit is entitled
as of right to a trial by jury prevails in suits initiated under statutes
analogous to the Housing and Rent Act. In Hepner v. United States,54
a case involving the Alien Immigration Law,55 the Court held such a
suit, whether regarded as one for a penalty or for liquidated damages,
to be a civil suit for which debt would lie. A more emphatic position
was taken in Fleitmann v. Welsbach Street Lighting Co.56 where the
Court was of the opinion: 57
. . . that when a penalty of triple damages is sought to be inflicted,
the statute should not be read as attempting to authorize liability to be
enforced otherwise than through the verdict of a jury in a court of
common law.
49 United States v. Shaughnessy, 86 F. Supp. 175 (D. Mass. 1949).
50 59 F. Supp. 684 (S. D. N. Y. 1945).
51 3 F. R. D. 58 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
52 Winthrop Chemical Co. v. Blackman, 159 Misc. 451, 288 N. Y. Supp. 389
(Sup. Ct. 1936). In an attempt by the plaintiff to secure triple damages for
patent infringement, the court held that such damages are exemplary damages and
no action of the defendant, no matter how fraudulent or wrong, can give equity
the right to grant such damages.
53 202 Fed. 728, 732 (9th Cir. 1913).
54 213 U. S. 103, 29 S. Ct. 474, 53 L. Ed. 720 (1909).
55 32 STAT. 1213 (1903), as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1946).
56 240 U. S. 27, 36 S. Ct. 233, 60 L. Ed. 505 (1916). This case was decided
under the Sherman Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq.
(1946). Also see Ring v. Spina, 166 F. (2d) 546 (2d Cir. 1948), decided under the
Sherman Act; Olearchick v. American Steel Foundries, 73 F. Supp. 273, 279 (W. D.
Pa. 1947), decided under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 STAT. 1060 (1938),
as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 201 et seq. (1946).
37 Id., 240 U. S. at 29.
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What nature such an action would take in a common law court was not
discussed, although it would not be material if the test in Parsons v.
Bedford controlled. 58
A second question arises in those instances where the defendant
avails himself of the defense provided by Section 1895 and attempts
to prove that the overcharges were neither willful nor the result of
failure to take practicable precautions against the violation. The burden
of proof is upon the landlord 59 and he must be given the opportunity
to present this defense.6 0 The principle underlying the question is that
where facts are in dispute and reasonable minds might differ, the
question is one of fact for the jury.6 ' More specifically, where the
question of willfulness is in issue, it is a proper function of a jury to
assess and treble the damages. 62 It is to be noted that this aspect is
one of practicability and is not in itself determinative of the right to
trial by jury under the Constitution. However, the principle has been
held applicable to actions brought pursuant to statutes authorizing
multiple damages for willful torts. For example, in an action for
double or triple damages for willful destruction of trees, if willfulness
is put in issue, it is a proper function of the jury to determine the fact.63
Similarly, this principle has been applied to actions brought under the
rent control laws. Thus, it has generally been held reversible error for
a judge to direct a verdict in an action for unlawful detainer when a
defense of good faith is interposed and reasonable minds might reach
different conclusions. 64 In a direct application to the triple damage
clause in the Housing and Rent Act, the Iowa court in Smith v.
Scobee 65 held that the question of the willfulness of the landlord's
overcharge was a question of fact which was for a jury to determine.
Thus, on principle and precedent, the nature of the landlord's conduct
clearly becomes another factor in determining whether the case shall
be tried with or without a jury.
58 3 Pet. 433, 7 L. Ed. 732, 737 (U. S. 1830). In Garrett v. Kennedy, 193
Okla. 605, 145 P. (2d) 407 (1943), the court held that exemplary damages are
restricted to actions where the parties are entitled to a jury trial as a matter
of right.
59 United States v. Earl Holding Co., 88 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1950).
60 West v. Winston, 8 F. R. D. 311 (E. D. Pa. 1948).
61 Banks v. Watrous, 134 Conn. 592, 59 A. (2d) 723 (1948).
62 Falt v. Krug, 239 Iowa 766, 32 N. W. (2d) 781 (1948).
63 Gibson v. Thisius, 16 Wash. (2d) 693, 134 P. (2d) 713 (1943); Boneck
v. Herman, 247 Wis. 592, 20 N. W. (2d) 664 (1945).
64 Sviggum v. Phillips, 217 Minn. 586, 15 N. W. (2d) 109 (1944); Cielinski
v. Clark, 223 S. W. (2d) 139 (St. Louis, Mo. Ct. App. 1949); Cosgrove v. Jones,
194 Okla. 641, 154 P. (2d) 55 (1944).
65 241 Iowa 723, 42 N. W. (2d) 589 (1950).
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Conclusion
The Federal Housing and Rent Act of 1947 is silent on the question
of trial by jury and little assistance can be gleaned from an analysis
of the congressional intent. In commenting upon the silence of the
Constitution as far as trial by jury in civil actions was concerned, prior
to the adoption of the Seventh Amendment, Hamilton pointed out that
silence is not abolition.66 Even were the Act to expressly deny the right,
that alone would not determine whether a denial is constitutional. The
court in a recent case 67 pointed out that:
• . . when a federal statute embraces a common-law form of action,
that action does not lose its identity merely because it finds itself en-
meshed in a statute. The right of trial by jury in an action for debt
still prevails whatever modern name may be applied to the action.
Granting that more expedient determinations can be made by a
court without a jury, does it necessarily follow that the proper remedy
for crowded dockets is to jeopardize the constitutional guarantees? That
this solution could be dangerous has been noted: 68
To hold otherwise would be to open the way for Congress to nullify
the Constitutional right of trial by jury by mere statutory enactments.
It is by such methods that courts lose their power to enforce the
Bill of Rights.
It has been held that the right to a jury trial is a basic and fundamental
feature of our system of jurisprudence. It is the duty of the courts to
guard this right even to the extent of indulging in presumptions against
its waiver. 69 The right was not easily acquired and the interest of the
American people in its integrity has not diminished since Justice Story
first voiced definite convictions concerning it.
Luke R. Morin
Torts
THE EFFECT OF A PLEA OF GUILTY OR A CONVICTION ON A SUBSEQUENT
ACTION FOR FALSE ARRST AND IMPRISONMENT
The present-day tort action for false arrest and imprisonment is a
development from the ancient action of trespass, first receiving recogni-
tion in Bracton's Note Book.' The strict conception limiting the action
to cases of actual, physical confinement was at an early date broadened
66 THE FEDERAusT, No. 83 at 539 (Modern Library ed. 1937).
67 United States v. Jepson, 90 F. Supp. 983, 986 (D. N. J. 1950).
68 Ibid.
69 Olearchick v. American Steel Foundries, 73 F. Supp. 273, 279 (W. D. Pa.
1947).
1 Woodbine, The Origins of the Action of Trespass, 34 YALE L. J. 343, 369
n.116 (1925).
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to encompass other instances of restraint.2 Gradual evolution of these
basic concepts has resulted in a modern interpretation which finds ex-
pression in the words of a Missouri court where it pointed out that: 3
False imprisonment may be committed by words alone, or by acts
alone, or by both and by merely operating the will of the individual....
It is not necessary that the individual be confined within a prison or
assaulted or touched.
A distinction between the actions of false arrest and false imprison-
ment exists in that false arrest necessarily includes false imprisonment
based on asserted legal authority, while false imprisonment itself is
purely a matter between private persons. 4 The present treatment is
concerned with false imprisonment following an actual arrest. The
precise question to be considered here is whether a person who has
pleaded guilty of the offense for which he was arrested is barred by the
plea from recovering in a subsequent false arrest and imprisonment
action.
Investigation of the problem reveals an almost equal quantitative
division of authority. The leading cases expounding the two views are
Erie R.R. v. Reigherd,5 and McCullough v. Greenfield.6 In the Reigherd
case, the court held that the plea of guilty 7 "destroyed the very foun-
dation of any action for illegal arrest. . . " and that "Sound principles
of public policy are opposed to sustaining a suit which is inconsistent
with the voluntary action of the plaintiff.. . 2" The Greenfield case held
that 8 -... the weight of authority does not favor the conclusion that
the liability for the illegal arrest is waived by pleading guilty to the
offense charged in the warrant." Of interest is the fact that both opin-
ions purport to state the majority view. And as late as 1933, the
Supreme Court of Oregon recognized this split of authority as being
an actual one.9 Therefore, the purpose of the following discussion is to
attempt to reconcile the two views and to show that both opinions,
though mutually exclusive on their face, do in fact state the "majority
view." To effect this purpose, it must be pointed out that the crux
of the problem lies in the circumstances, i.e., the legality or the illegality
of the arrest as determined by the facts of each case.
I.
Where the arrest which gave rise to the subsequent false imprison-
ment action was illegal, by reason of some defect which the existence
2 PRossER, TORTS § 12 (1941).
3 Gust v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 234 Mo. App. 611, 136 S. W. (2d) 94,
97 (1940).
4 Alsup v. Skaggs Drug Center, 203 Okla. 525, 223 P. (2d) 530, 533 (1949).
5 166 Fed. 247 (6th Cir. 1909).
6 133 Mich. 463, 95 N. W. 532 (1903).
7 166 Fed. at 251.
8 95 N. W. at 534.
9 McLean v. Sanders, 143 Ore. 524, 23 P. (2d) 321, 322 (1933).
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of probable cause would not remedy, the plea of guilty, or the convic-
tion, is not a bar to the action.' 0 Thus a plea of guilty is not conclusive
against a plaintiff where the misdemeanor for which he was arrested
had not in fact been committed, and the plea of guilty entered solely
in preference to remaining in jail."
In McCullough v. Greenfield,12 the court considered a case involving
two arrests followed by a plea of guilty to the offense charged in the
warrant. The first arrest was illegal because the arresting officer had
no warrant to arrest for the past misdemeanor; the second was legal
because another officer who had a warrant made the arrest. The court
reasoned that the plea of guilty or the conviction can be considered
in the false imprisonment action only as showing probable cause for
the arrest, and that since probable cause could not affect the illegal
arrest, it held that the plea did not constitute a waiver of the illegal
arrest.
Later cases offer additional expositions of this rule. Where the
offense, a misdemeanor, was not committed in the presence of the
arresting officer, the plea of guilty was held to be immaterial, having no
bearing on the false imprisonment action. 13 An arrest for a misdemeanor
which in fact was not committed by the person arrested caused the
plea of guilty to be treated only as evidence of an admission contrary
to the present contention of the plaintiff, 14 and not as a waiver of any
rights arising by reason of the arrest.15 Evidence of a conviction fol-
lowing an arrest made without a warrant for a past misdemeanor was
ruled inadmissable in the false arrest action since damages were sought
solely for injuries suffered at the time of the arrest. 16 Where the plea
of guilty was obtained by fear, duress, or intimidation, it did not
constitute a defense to the false imprisonment action.'" In the most
recent case on this section of the topic,18 where the misdemeanor was
10 E.g., Larson v. Feeney, 196 Mich. 1, 162 N. W. 275, 277 (1917). In a
similar vein, the fact that the plaintiff had knowledge of a prevalent custom of
arresting in the illegal manner, or that he posted bail, appeared at the trial,
and consented to a termination of the proceedings by an entry of "Neither Party,"
was held not to constitute a waiver of the illegal arrest, when the illegality arose
by reason of a failure to comply with the statutory requirements. Buzzell v.
Emerton, 161 Mass. 176, 36 N. E. 796 (1894); Williams v. Shillaber, 153 Mass.
541, 27 N. E. 767 (1891).
11 Texas & P. Ry. v. Parker, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 264, 68 S. W. 831 (1902).
12 133 Mich. 463, 95 N. W. 532 (1903).
13 Knickerbocker Steamboat Co. v. Cusack, 172 Fed. 358 (2d Cir. 1905).
14 Spain v. Oregon-Washington R. & Nav. Co., 78 Ore. 355, 153 Pac. 470,
473-4 (1915).
15 Larson v. Feeney, 196 Mich. 1, 162 N. W. 275, 277 (1917).
16 Crosswhite v. Barnes, 139 Va. 471, 124 S. E. 242, 246 (1924).
17 Dailey v. State, 190 Misc. 542, 75 N. Y. S. (2d) 40 (Ct. Cl. 1947). Here,
the commission of the misdemeanor, intoxication, was in issue, and the arresting
officers were guilty of assault and battery in performing the arrest.
18 Hotzel v. Simmons, 258 Wis. 234,45 N. W. (2d) 683 (1951).
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committed on a train in one state, an arrest by the conductor at that
time was valid, but the subsequent arrest by the police of another
state, at the instance of the conductor, was invalid. The plea of
guilty there entered, together with the subsequent conviction, had no
effect on the false imprisonment action since the latter state had no
jurisdiction to try the crime charged. In Collins v. Owens,19 the court
tersely defended the law on this point:
The reason for the rule is obvious. A person may be guilty of an
offense and may plead guilty thereto, but the arrest without a warrant
may still be illegal.
Stated simply, the rule is that, given an illegal arrest, a plea of guilty
or a conviction in the criminal proceedings will not have conclusive
effect on the right of the person arrested to recover for the false or
illegal arrest and imprisonment.
II.
The following cases will demonstrate that when the arrest is legal,
or when probable cause will validate the arrest, the plea of guilty or
the conviction will function as a bar or defense in a later false imprison-
ment action. Although neither this formula nor its essential ingredients
were examined by the court in Jones v. Foster,2 0 an early New York
case, that decision contains the ruling that a plea of guilty effectually
bars the action for false imprisonment. In that case a peddler was
arrested by a local police chief while selling goods without a license
in violation of a village ordinance. In the hearing before a police justice
the peddler changed his original plea of not guilty to guilty when he
was faced with the prospect of securing bail or spending the night in
confinement. When he later sued for false imprisonment, the plea of
guilty barred the action. Since there was no dispute as to the lawful-
ness of the arrest, the actual legality concluded the rights of the peddler
in the subsequent action.21
When a person was arrested by an officer for being intoxicated in
a public place, the court, in Erie R. R. v. Reigherd,22 held that a plea
of guilty destroyed the basis for a false imprisonment action. An exami-
nation of the circumstances in the Reigherd case reveals that the
19 77 Cal. App. (2d) 713, 176 P. (2d) 372, 375 (1947).
20 43 App. Div. 33, 59 N. Y. Supp. 738, 739 (4th Dep't 1899). Two previous
New York decisions held that a conviction would bar the false imprisonment
action. Cuniff v. Beecher, 84 Hun 137, 32 N. Y. Supp. 1067 (Sup. Ct. 1895)
(valid arrest for disorderly conduct); Oppenheimer v. Manhattan Ry., 63 Hun
634, 18 N. Y. Supp. 411 (Sup. Ct. 1892) (lawful arrest).
21 Similarly, a waiver of formal writ, Williamson v. Wilcox, 63 Miss. 335
(1885), barred recovery. This case involved legal arrests. The court indicated, 63
Miss. at 337-8, that -the problem presented an apt situation for application of
the maxim "volenti non fit injuria."
22 166 Fed. 247 (6th Cir. 1909).
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misdemeanor was committed in the presence of the officer, therefore
the arrest and reasonable imprisonment were lawful. Two cases,
Louisville Ry. v. Hutti,23 and Holder v. St. Louis & S. F. R. R.,
2 4
involving disorderly conduct on a train, support the rule that a plea
of guilty is conclusive proof of probable cause for an arrest and is a
complete defense. In both cases the arrests were legal. Where the person
bringing the action for false imprisonment was arrested for disturbing
the peace by chasing, annoying and frightening girls in the presence
of the arresting officer, a plea of guilty before a magistrate barred
the action.2 5 The same conclusion was reached where a sportsman was
caught in the act of hunting in a posted area; 26 where a person was
charged with vagrancy and conceded that the arrest was legal; 27 and
where a passenger on a street car was arrested by the police because
of his drunken condition. 28 A plea of guilty to a traffic violation, which
offense was committed in the presence of the arresting officer, estab-
lished probable cause for the arrest and therefore precluded recovery
for wrongful detention in Ryan v. Conover.
2 9
When misdemeanors are committed in the presence of a peace officer,
he may properly arrest without a warrant. Clearly, a plea or a convic-
tion tends to establish that the officer had cause to believe a misde-
meanor was being committed. When the existence of this causal element
validates the arrest, the plea or conviction is a defense. The issue,
therefore, is not merely whether a plea of guilty or a conviction is or
is not a bar, but rather whether the legality of the arrest is established,
either in fact, or by the existence of probable cause. The Supreme Court
of Michigan indorsed this theory in 1938.30 The court was of the
opinion that a justice court conviction furnished conclusive proof of
probable cause for the arrest. This decision is an implied repudiation
of the earlier Michigan case of McCullough v. Greenfield.
8 ' In a recent
treatment of this aspect of the problem, a Kansas court in Hill v. Day,
3 2
applying the state laws governing arrest, held that a police court con-
viction was conclusive as to probable cause for the arrest. This perfected
the arrest and recovery for false imprisonment was denied.
23 141 Ky. 511, 133 S. W. 200 (1911). This case is followed in Waddle v.
Wilson, 164 Ky. 228, 175 S. W. 382 (1915) (conviction).
24 155 Mo. App. 664, 135 S. W. 507 (1911).
25 Hushaw v. Dunn, 62 Colo. 109, 160 Pac. 1037 (1916).
26 Williams v. Brooks, 95 Wash. 410, 163 Pac. 925 (1917) (plea of guilty).
27 Crowley v. Rummel, 22 Ariz. 179, 195 Pac. 986 (1921) (trial and convic-
tion).
28 Alter v. Arkansas Power & Light Co, 188 Ark. 681, 67 S. W. (2d) 177
(1934) (trial and conviction); accord, Smoker v. Ohl, 335 Pa. 270, 6 A. (2d)
810 (1939).
29 59 Ohio App. 361, 18 N. E. (2d) 277 (1938).
30 Doak v. Springstead, 284 Mich. 459, 279 N. W. 898 (1938); accord, Lowry
v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 54 Cal. App. (2d) 782, 130 P. (2d) 1 (1942).
31 133 Mich. 463, 95 N. W. 532 (1903).
32 168 Kan. 604, 215 P. (2d) 219 (1950).
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From the earliest times courts have been liberal in admitting various
factors which tend to mitigate damages sought in a false imprisonment
action.3 3 Although a cause.of action for false imprisonment is estab-
lished, the plea of guilty, or the conviction, since it tends to show pro-
bable cause and reasonableness, rebuts the claim for punitive damages. 34
However, when only actual damages are sought, the plea of guilty is
inadmissable to mitigate the damages.3 5
It is evident that the split of authority is apparent and not actual.
The case law examined in toto conclusively demonstrates that the plea
of guilty, or its equivalent, the conviction, has value in the false im-
prisonment action only for the purpose of establishing probable cause
for the arrest. If the existence of probable cause will not validate the
arrest, that is, if the arrest is defective in a sense on which probable
cause has no bearing, then the plea of guilty, or the conviction, is not
a bar to the false imprisonment action. Conversely, if the legality of
the arrest can be established, either by supplying the element of
probable cause, or by applying the arrest laws of the particular state,





THE RESIDUARY CLAUSE AND POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
Testamentary execution of a power of appointment by an express
provision in the will is a common and well-settled practice. However,
where the execution of a power is allowed to depend upon the often
vague wording of the residuary clause, problems of construction arise.
Collateral is the difficulty in determining proper disposition of the
appointive property if the attempted execution is ineffective.
Because of the attention focused upon this phase of law by the
Powers of Appointment Act of 1951,1 a discussion of the principles
relating to the execution of powers by a residuary clause is in order.
33 Beckwith v. Bean, 98 U. S. 266, 25 L. Ed. 124 (1879); Rogers v. Toliver,
139 Ga. 281, 77 S. E. 28 (1913); Palmer v. Maine Cent. R. R., 92 Me. 399, 42
At. 800 (1899).
34 Collins v. Owens, 77 Cal. App. (2d) 713, 176 P. (2d) 372 (1947)
35 Crosswhite v. Barnes, 139 Va. 471, 124 S. E. 242 (1924). The court noted
that the rule is otherwise on the issue of punitive damages.
1 Pub. L. No. 58, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (June 28, 1951).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
I.
The Residuary Clause as a Means of Executing Powers of Appointment
At common law a will which did not refer to a power of appoint-
ment was not presumed to exercise it.2 This rule and its statutory
modifications have an important effect upon the interpretation of
residuary clauses.
The federal court in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner 3 pointed
up the problem. The testator had a general power of appointment over
two trust funds and in one paragraph of the will, he bequeathed one-half
of all his property of whatever kind to his wife. He also provided that
if his total personal and real property amounted to at least $100,000,
certain bequests would go to named persons. Lastly, he devised and
bequeathed all the rest, residue and remainder of his property of
whatever kind and wherever situated, owned by him at the time of his
death, to one Katherine Tingley. The court ruled that the residuary
clause effectively executed the powers of appointment, since under
the rule in Massachusetts, where the trusts were established, a general
residuary devise operates as an execution of a power to appoint by
will, unless a contrary intent is manifested in the will. In so ruling, the
court deemed the testator's repetition of the phrase "all my property
of whatever kind and wherever situated owned by me at the time of my
death" to create a presumption, under the Massachusetts rule, that he
intended to exercise the powers.
4
This Massachusetts rule, though firmly established there,5 is gen-
erally not accepted elsewhere. Other views have been taken in the
absence of statute and the prevailing rule is that a power of appoint-
ment is not executed by the residuary clause of the donee's will unless
an intent to do so clearly appears in the will. 6 However, additional
prestige is enjoyed by the Massachusetts rule because it has been
codified in many states to eliminate the possibility that a power might
be defeated by mere failure to refer to it in the will.7 Without these
2 Sims, FuTuRE INTERESTS § 63 (1951).
3 73 F. (2d) 970 (1st Cir. 1934).
4 Id. at 971.
5 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 73 F. (2d) 970 (1st Cir. 1934);
Pitman v. Pitman, 314 Mass. 465, 50 N. E. (2d) 69 (1943); Slayton v. Fitch
Home, Inc., 293 Mass. 574, 200 N. E. 357 (1936); Boston Safe Deposit & Trust
Co. v. Prindle, 290 Mass. 577, 195 N. E. 793 (1935); Worcester Bank & Trust Co.
v. Sibley, 287 Mass. 594, 192 N. E. 31 (1934).
6 Harrison v. Lee, 3 F. (2d) 796 (5th Cir. 1925); Johnson v. Shriver, 121
Colo. 397, 216 P. (2d) 653 (1950); Emery v. Emery, 325 Ill. 212, 156 N. E. 364
(1927); Thomson v. Ehrlich, 148 S. C. 330, 146 S. E. 149 (1928).
7 The following statutes are illlustrative: CA. PROB. CODE ANN. § 125 (1944);
MIcH. STAT. ANN4. tit. 26, § 26.143 (1937); N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 18; N. Y.
REAL PROP. LAW § 176.
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statutes, the donee of a power who neglected to refer specifically to
the power he was attempting to exercise, perhaps because he had a life
estate in the property and customarily thought of it as his own, was
denied a full and complete testamentary disposition. Under these sta-
tutes, a residuary gift by the testator will pass the property over which
he has a power of appointment unless a contrary intention is clearly
shown.8
These rules raise the question of how the intent to exercise or
refrain from exercising a power may be manifested. Of course, it may
be shown by an express reference to the power in the will, which
purports to have been drawn with the exercise of the power in mind.9
However, express reference to the power is by no means essential to
its exercise.1 0 Three other methods have long been recognized: n1
(1) by some reference to the power in the will or other instrument;
(2) by reference to the property which is the subject of the power;
or (3) by a provision which would be inoperative except as an exercise
of the power.12 Although one of the three is usually required, some
courts have found an intent to exercise a power from indicia not
strictly within these categories.' 3 This is true where the intent to
execute a power has been gathered simply from the apparent purpose
of gifts and directions, or from the general tone of the will. 14 Since
the intent of the testator is controlling, these outlying decisions, in
which the courts earnestly seek to carry out the testator's intent, are
patently sound in principle.
Under the second method listed above, there is some question as to
whether a gift in a residuary clause of "all my property" is a sufficient
reference to the appointive property to be effective as an exercise of
the power.15 Many courts have refused to honor it as such, reasoning
either that the appointive property is not the property of the testator,
8 Greenway v. Irvine, 235 Ky. 363, 31 S. W. (2d) 606 (1930); Low v. Bank-
ers Trust Co., 270 N. Y. 143, 200 N. E. 674 (1936); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Halsted,
245 N. Y. 447, 157 N. E. 739 (1927); In re Biddle's Estate, 333 Pa. 316, 5 A. (2d)
158 (1939).
9 Campbell v. Fowler, 226 Ky. 548, 11 S. V. (2d) 423 (1928); Reeside et ux.
v. Annex Bldg. Ass'n, 165 Md. 200, 167 Atl. 72 (1933); Adger v. Kirk, 116 S. C.
298, 108 S. E. 97 (1921).
10 See note 2 supra.
11 Blagge v. Miles, 3 Fed. Cas. 559, No. 1, 479 (D. Mass. 1841).
12 See 3 PAGE, Wnxs § 1331 (3d ed. 1941).
13 Rice v. Park, 223 Ala. 317, '135 So. 472 (1931) ; Rettig v. Zander, 364 Ill.
112, 4 N. E. (2d) 30 (1936); Funk v. Eggleston, 92 Ill. 515 (1879); Paul v. Paul,
99 N. J. Eq. 498, 133 Atl. 868 (Ch. 1926); Munson v. Berdan, 35 N. J. Eq. 376,
378 (Ch. 1882); ". . . it is sufficient if the act shows that the donee had in view
the subject of the power."
14 Blake v. Hawkins, 98 U. S. 315, 25 L. Ed. 139 (1879).
15 This was a collateral problem discussed in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Com-
missioner, 73 F. (2d) 970 (1st Cir. 1934).
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or that a power is not property. 16 Others have upheld the reference
on the ground that words of absolute ownership indicate an execution
of the power. 17 Another question that arises is whether a power is
effectively exercised by reference to the appointive property, if the
testator owns an interest in it. In this situation, a clause in the testator's
will devising the property might be construed as merely a devise of
his own interest rather than as an exercise of the power. The statutes
embodying the Massachusetts rule solve these questions, for they
declare that a will purporting to pass all of the 'testator's property shall
exercise a power of appointment in the absence of a contrary intent
appearing in the instrument. 18
The third method of showing an intent to exercise a power has
also given rise to considerable litigation. Until the departure by the
Massachusetts courts, 1 9 it was generally insisted that this third method
could only be applied as evidence indicating merely an intent to exercise
a power; and then only if the provision in the will would otherwise be
totally inoperative. If the testator had any individual property upon
which the provision could operate, extrinsic evidence as to its inade-
quacy was inadmissible to show an intent to exercise a power.20 This
narrow holding has been repudiated in most American jurisdictions, and
extrinsic evidence of the complete absence or inadequacy of property
with which to carry out the provision in question has been consistently
admitted.21 This is within the spirit of the prevailing rule which pro-
vides that when a will is clearly worded, extrinsic evidence is not ad-
missible to alter the meaning of the ordinary terms used,22 but that
if it is ambiguous, such evidence may be admitted to show whether or
not he intended to exercise a power.23
16 Hollister v. Shaw, 46 Conn. 248, 255 (1878); Emery v. Emery, 325 Ill.
212, 156 N. E. 364, 368-9 (1927); Patterson v. Wilson, 64 Md. 193, 1 Atl. 68, 70-1
(1885).
17 Lee v. Simpson, 134 U. S. 572, 10 S. Ct. 631, 638, 33 L. Ed. 1038 (1890);
Bullerdick v. Wright, 148 Ind. 477, 47 N. E. 931, 933 (1897).
18 See note 8 supra. See also RESTATEMEINT, PROPERTY § 343, comment d
(Supp. 1948).
19 Amory v. Meredith, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 397 (1863).
20 Patterson v. Wilson, 64 Md. 193, 1 Atl. 68 (1885); Nannock v. Horton,
7 Ves. 391, 32 Eng. Rep. 158 (1802).
21 E.g., Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v. Thayer, 105 Conn. 57, 134 Atl.
155 (1926).
22 Harvard Trust Co. v. Frost, 258 Mass. 319, 154 N. E. 863 (1927).
23 Wyeth v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 176 Md. 369, 4 A. (2d)
753 (1939); Camden Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Fitler, 123 N. J. Eq. 245, 197
Atl. 249 (Ch. 1938); In re Jackson's Estate, 337 Pa. 561, 12 A. (2d) 338 (1940).
Declarations of the testator's intent not found in the will are ordinarily not ad-
missible, but evidence as to his knowledge concerning the power and the nature
and extent of the property subject to it is admissible. 3 PAOE, op. cit. supra note
12, § 1331.
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It appears, then, that the above three methods of manifesting an
intent to exercise a power of appointment are reliable, but that some
tendency is noticeable in the courts to effect this intent by reliance
upon extrinsic evidence, especially where there is some ambiguity
in the will.
In the states which have passed statutes providing that a will pur-
porting to pass all of the testator's property will execute a power of
appointment, the question of what evidence of a contrary intent will
negate this execution is a troublesome one. These statutes vary widely
in detail, but their general provisions and effect are similar. Although
not all are explicitly restricted to situations where there appears no
contrary intent, this qualification generally seems implicit.
24
A contrary intention is sometimes manifested by an inconsistency
between the instrument exercising the power and an instrument executed
previously which reserved the power. 25 If the will purporting to exercise
the power of appointment was executed before the instrument reserving
the power, that fact will constitute a contrary intention apparent on
the face of the will.
2 6
Under the statute in Pennsylvania, 27 the statutory presumption that
the testator intended to exercise a power of appointment 28
. . . may be overcome, moreover, only by the presence in the will of
language clearly indicative of a contrary dispositive intent, or of a form
or method of disposition inconsistent with an exercise of the power. The
contrary intent must appear from the will itself, not from extraneous
circumstances.
24 RESTATEMNT, PROPERTY § 343, comment d (Supp. 1948).
25 Guaranty Trust Co. v. Halsted, 245 N. Y. 447, 157 N. E. 739 (1927).
26 Gassinger v. Thillman, 160 Md. 194, 153 AtI. 19 (1930). Reference here to
the date of publication of the will would indicate the contrary intent to be appar-
ent on the face of the will. However, in Lederer v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of
Baltimore, 182 Md. 422, 35 A. (2d) 166 (1943), a case similar on the facts, a
codicil enacted after the deed of trust which had created the power of appoint-
ment in the testator and which had been drafted after the will, effectively exercised
the power, since the deed, will and codicil became in law one instrument.
An unusual result from a somewhat similar set of facts is found in a con-
temporaneous decision. H and W set up a trust, the property to go to whomever
H appointed in his will, after the death of both H and W. H's will had been
executed previously with, of course, no reference to the power. Nevertheless, the
court held that the general residuary clause which named W as beneficiary was
an effective exercise of the power, even though it had been drafted prior to the
trust instrument and though W was deceased at the date of exercise. The court
relied on CAL. PROB. CODE AwN. § 125 (1944), which provides that the power shall
be effectively exercised by a will regardless of the date of execution of the will, if
it is otherwise an effective appointment. California Trust Co. v. Ott, 59 Cal. App.
(2d) 715, 140 P. (2d) 79 (1943).
27 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 223 (1950).
28 Provident Trust Co. of Philadelphia v. Scott, 333 Pa. 231, 6 A. (2d) 814,
816 (1939).
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The court in this case held that since the testator, who was the donee
of two powers of appointment, mentioned one of the powers in one
clause of her will, but mentioned neither in the residuary clause, there
was insufficient indication of an intent not to exercise the power which
she failed to mention.
Another manifestation of intent not to exercise a power of appoint-
ment is found in a Kentucky case 29 which applied a statute similar
in effect to those previously mentioned. The testator was held to have
manifested an intent not to exercise the power reserved to him by his
wife's will, by explicitly directing in his will that it be delivered back
to his wife at his death. The court pointed out that any indication
of an intent not to exercise the power must be "gleaned from the four
corners of the husband's will. .... , 30
That the exercise of the power, though aided by the statutory pre-
sumption and unhindered by a contrary intent, may nevertheless be
ineffective is clearly indicated in a New York case. 31 There it was
held that property passed in default of appointment because the resi-
duary clause exercised the power in a manner that illegally suspended
the power of alienation. By the residuary clause the testator bequeathed
the property to his two children, neither of whom was living at the
time the power was reserved. This violated the New York Rule against
Perpetuities 32 which prohibited the suspension of the absolute owner-
ship of personal property for more than two lives in being. However,
the point of significance to the present discussion was that the power
was in fact exercised by the residuary clause, although no reference
was made to it and though there was no expression of intent to exercise
it. The controlling New York statute supplies the intent to exercise the
power, so long as it is not overcome by a manifestation of contrary
intent.
33
Turning to a different problem, some question exists as to whether
the typical statute is applicable to both general and special powers. In
Massachusetts, where a presumption in favor of the exercise of a
power exists even without legislative promulgation, there is respectable
dictum that special powers should be construed by the rules governing
general powers. 34 Pennsylvania has held that special powers can be
29 United States Trust Co. v. Winchester, 277 Ky. 434, 126 S. W. (2d) 814
(1939).
30 Id., 126 S. W. (2d) at 816.
31 Low v. Bankers Trust Co., 270 N. Y. 143, 200 N. E. 674 (1936).
32 N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 11.
33 N. Y. PFRS. PROP. LAW § 18 provides: "Personal property embraced in a
power to bequeath, passes by a will or testament purporting to pass all the per-
sonal property of the testator; unless the intent, that the will or testament shall
not operate as an execution of the power, appears therein either expressly or by
necessary implication."
34 Stone v. Forbes, 189 Mass. 163, 75 N. E. 141, 143 (1905).
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exercised without a direct reference, if all the members of the permitted
class are named as beneficiaries of the power.3 5
A decision representative of the modern trend, because it strongly
favored the exercise of a power of appointment, despite rather per-
suasive arguments to the contrary, was recently handed down in Michi-
gan.3 6 The donor of the power had specifically provided that a general
residuary clause in the donee's will would not be effective as an exercise
of the power. Nevertheless, the court upheld the donee's residuary
clause as an effective exercise of the power, reasoning that it was
probably the donor's intent, by the restriction against residuary clause
exercise, to prevent a thoughtless and unintentional exercise of the
power. Since the donee had taken great pains to draw a carefully
phrased will, the court apparently thought that the danger of a rash
exercise, which the donor had sought to preclude, was alleviated and
the donor's intent was given effect. This is an extreme example of the
strength of the statutory presumption in favor of the exercise of a
power of appointment, although the case ostensibly seems correctly
decided.
Summarizing, in the states which have legislated a presumption in
favor of the exercise of a power, it appears that there is a slight
tendency toward a liberal interpretation of these statutes. An intent
not to exercise the power cannot be proved by evidence without the
"four corners" of the will. In contrast with this view are the common
law states where some courts have exhibited a tendency to admit
extrinsic evidence to prove an intent to execute the power, especially
if the will is ambiguous.
Furthermore, special as well as general powers may be exercised
by this statutory presumption in several states. This liberal tendency
proves to be a salutary influence in the accomplishment of the ultimate
purpose of the law of wills - to effect the testator's intent.
II.
The Residuary Clause and Blending
Blending is a procedure whereby the donee of a general power of
appointment fuses the appointive property and his own estate into
one homogeneous mass. Thereafter, further dispositions of the appoin-
tive property are considered gifts of the donee's own property. Blending
will often be of legal significance in the attempted execution of a
power of appointment by means of a general residuary clause. If the
appointment lapses, for instance, because of the death of the appointee,
35 In re Biddle's Estate, 333 Pa. 316, 5 A. (2d) 158 (1939); In re Lafferty's
Estate, 311 Pa. 455, 167 AtI. 44 (1933).
36 In re Kilpatrick's Estate, 318 Mich. 445, 28 N. W. (2d) 286 (1947).
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as in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Allen,37 the appointive property will go
to the donee or his estate, if blending is established. If the exercise
of a general power is effective, blending may allow the donee's creditors
to reach the appointive property because in effect, the property becomes
that of the donee.
38
The relation of the blending to execution of powers by a residuary
clause was illustrated by the Allen case. The donee of a general testa-
mentary power of appointment left the residue of her estate, after
providing for payments of debts and legacies, to her two sisters. One
of these sisters predeceased the donee. The residuary clause effectively
exercised the power, under the previously-discussed Massachusetts
rule favoring such exercise. However, since one of the appointees pre-
deceased the donee, the court ruled that the lapsed share of the appoin-
tive property should go back to the estate of the donee, because she
had by employing the residuary clause to dispose of both her own
and the appointive property, indicated an intent to blend the property
with her own before devising it to her sisters.
It appears, then, that appointive property will be blended with
that of the donee if the donee manifests an intent to do so. 3 9 While
blending apparently occurs more readily where an attempted exercise
of the power is invalid or ineffective, 40 an invalid or ineffective exercise
is by no means a prerequisite to blending. Under a general power of
appbintment, the donee may exercise the power so as to blend the
appointive property with his own, even though there was no other
attempted exercise.
41
The use of the residuary clause to exercise a power is itself consid-
ered by some authorities to be strongly indicative of an intent to blend
the appointive property with the testator's own estate.42 This is un-
doubtedly true under statutes providing for the presumptive exercise
37 307 Mass. 40, 29 N. E. (2d) 310 (1940).
38 E.g., Stratton v. United States, 50 F. (2d) 48 (1st Cir. 1931).
39 In re Stannert's Estate, 339 Pa. 439, 15 A. (2d) 360 (1940) ; In re Pennsyl-
vania Co. for Insurances, 264 Pa. 433, 107 Atl. 840 (1919) ; Rhode Island Hospital
Trust Co. v. Anthony, 49 R. I. 339, 142 Atl. 531 (1928). See RESTATEMENT, PRop-
ERTY §§ 329, 330 (1940).
40 E.g., Bradford v. Andrew, 308 111. 458, 139 N. E. 922 (1923).
41 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Allen, 307 Mass. 40, 29 N. E. (2d) 310 (1940);
Hammond v. Hammond, 234 Mass. 554, 125 N. E. 686 (1920). See GRAY, RULE
AGA sT PERPrTuis § 540.1 (4th ed. 1942). A Pennsylvania court pointed out
that: "The mere fact that the appointed estate is given to the same persons who
take the residue of a testator's individual estate is not the test to be applied in
determining whether there has been a blending of the two estates, but the real
test . . . is whether the testator has treated the two estates as one for all purposes
and manifested an intent to commingle them generally." In re Hagen's Estate,
285 Pa. 326, 132 Atl. 175, 176 (1926).
42 E.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Allen, 307 Mass. 40, 29 N. E. (2d) 310, 312
(1940).
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of the power by a residuary clause, in the absence of a contrary intent.
Of course, if the residuary clause is worded so as to specifically include
appointive property, even stronger evidence of an intent to blend
arises.43 Also, language of absolute ownership, employed in a residuary
clause, is evidence of an intent to blend the appointive property with
the property of the donee.44 If the donee makes the appointive property
specifically chargeable with the payment of his debts, it is almost con-
clusive evidence of an intent to blend.
45
A general power of appointment can be executed in a twofold sense.
First, the donee may act to make the property his own for all purposes
of devolution; for instance, by appointing it to a trustee or an executor
for payment of his debts. Second, the donee may appoint the property
to particular objects of his bounty. In the latter situation, by so
appointing the property, the donee is regarded as taking the property
out of the instrument creating the power and blending it with his own.
Therefore, upon failure of the beneficiaries particularly designated to
take the property, it passes as the donee's property.40 The English
courts hold that the property will devolve as though it belonged to the
donee regardless of any provision for such contingencies in the instru-
ment creating the power.
47
The American courts, as already noted, have viewed blending in the
light of the apparent intent of the donee, as evidenced by the operation
of the instrument conferring the power of appointment.48 The English
courts, however, have often interpreted the problem as being controlled
by a criterion which is more arbitrary, yet more consistently applicable,
than the somewhat obscure test of intent. They often find blending
on the basis of a resulting trust.40 This occurs, for instance, when the
donee appoints the property upon trust for designated beneficiaries,
or when he appoints to his executors. 50
43 Bradford v. Andrew, 308 Il. 458, 139 N. E. 922 (1923); Osborne v. Holy-
oake, L. R. 22 Ch. D. 238 (1882).
44 In re Forney's Estate, 280 Pa. 282, 124 Atl. 424 (1924): "All the rest,
residue and remainder of my estate . . . including such property . . . as was given
to me by my father . . . in . . . his . . . will . . . and in the exercise of the
power of appointment therein conferred . . . I give . . . as follows. . ....
45 In re McCord's Estate, 276 Pa. 459, 120 Atl. 413 (1923); In re Ickerin-
gill's Estate, L. R. 17 Ch. D. 151 (1881).
46 In re De Lusi's Trusts, L. R. Ir. 3 Eq. 232 (1879).
47 E.g., Brickenden v. Williams, L. R. 7 Eq. 310 (1869).
48 Talbot v. Riggs, 287 Mass. 144, 191 N. E. 360 (1934); Hammond v. Ham-
mond, 234 Mass. 554, 125 N. E. 686 (1920); Lincoln Trust Co. v. Adams, 107
Misc. 639, 177 N. Y. Supp. 889 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
49 E.g., Wilkinson v. Schneider, L. R. 9 Eq. 423 (1870).
50 In re De Lusi's Trusts, L. R. Ir. 3 Eq. 232 (1879); In re Pinede's Settle-
ment, 12 Ch. D. 667 (1879); Brickenden -v. Williams, L. R. 7 Eq. 310 (1869);
Goodere v. Lloyd, 3 Sine. 538, 57 Eng. Rep. 1100 (1830).
